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Abstract. In this paper, we study games with continuous action spaces
and non-linear payo functions. Our key insight is that Lipschitz conti-
nuity of the payo function allows us to provide algorithms for nding
approximate equilibria in these games. We begin by studying Lipschitz
games, which encompass, for example, all concave games with Lipschitz
continuous payo functions. We provide an ecient algorithm for com-
puting approximate equilibria in these games. Then we turn our attention
to penalty games, which encompass biased games and games in which
players take risk into account. Here we show that if the penalty function
is Lipschitz continuous, then we can provide a quasi-polynomial time
approximation scheme. Finally, we study distance biased games, where
we present simple strongly polynomial time algorithms for nding best
responses in L1, L
2
2, and L1 biased games, and then use these algorithms
to provide strongly polynomial algorithms that nd 2=3, 5=7, and 2=3
approximations for these norms, respectively.
1 Introduction
Nash equilibria [18] are the central solution concept in game theory. However,
recent advances have shown that computing an exact Nash equilibrium is PPAD-
complete [7, 8], and so there are unlikely to be polynomial time algorithms for
this problem. The hardness of computing exact equilibria has lead to the study of
approximate equilibria: while an exact equilibrium requires that all players have
no incentive to deviate from their current strategy, an -approximate equilibrium
requires only that their incentive to deviate is less than .
A fruitful line of work has developed studying the best approximations that
can be found in polynomial-time for bimatrix games, which are two-player strate-
gic form games. There, after a number of papers [4, 9, 10], the best known algo-
rithm was given by Tsaknakis and Spirakis [20], who provide a polynomial time
algorithm that nds a 0:3393-equilibrium. A prominent open problem is whether
there exists a PTAS for this problem. The existence of an FPTAS was ruled out
by Chen, Deng, and Teng [7] unless PPAD = P. While the existence of a PTAS
remains open, there is however a quasi-polynomial approximation scheme given
by Lipton, Markakis, and Mehta [16].
In a strategic form game, the game is specied by giving each player a nite
number of strategies, and then specifying a table of payos that contains one
entry for every possible combination of strategies that the players might pick.
The players are allowed to use mixed strategies, and so ultimately the payo
function is a convex combination of the payos given in the table. However,
some games can only be modelled in a more general setting where the action
spaces are continuous, or the payo functions are non-linear.
For example, Rosen's seminal work [19] considered concave games, where each
player picks a vector from a convex set. The payo to each player is specied by
a function that satises the following condition: if every other player's strategy
is xed, then the payo to a player is a convex function over his strategy space.
Rosen proved that concave games always have an equilibrium. A natural subclass
of concave games, studied by Caragiannis, Kurokawa, and Procaccia [5], is the
class of biased games. A biased game is dened by a strategic form game, a base
strategy and a penalty function. The players play the strategic form game as
normal, but they all suer a penalty for deviating from their base strategy. This
penalty can be a non-linear function, such as the L22 norm.
In this paper, we study the computation of approximate equilibria in such
games. Our main observation is that Lipschitz continuity of the players' payo
functions (with respect to changes in the strategy space) allows us to provide
algorithms that nd approximate equilibria. Several papers have studied how
the Lipschitz continuity of the players' payo functions aects the existence, the
quality, and the complexity of the equilibria of the underlying game. Azrieli and
Shmaya [1] studied many player games and derived bounds for the Lipschitz
constant of the utility functions for the players that guarantees the existence
of pure approximate equilibria for the game. Daskalakis and Papadimitriou [11]
proved that anonymous games posses pure approximate equilibria whose quality
depends on the Lipschitz constant of the payo functions and the number of
pure strategies the players have and proved that these approximate equilibria
can be computed in polynomial time. Furthermore, they gave a polynomial-time
approximation scheme for anonymous games with many players and constant
number of pure strategies. Babichenko [2] presented a best-reply dynamic for
n-players Lipschitz anonymous games with two strategies which reaches an ap-
proximate pure equilibrium in O(n log n) steps. Deb and Kalai [12] studied how
some variants of the Lipschitz continuity of the utility functions are sucient to
guarantee hindsight stability of equilibria.
1.1 Our contribution
Lipschitz games. We begin by studying a very general class of games, where
each player's strategy space is continuous, and represented by a convex set of
vectors, and where the only restriction is that the payo function is Lipschitz
continuous. This class encompasses, for example, every concave game in which
the payos are Lipschitz continuous. This class is so general that exact equilibria,
and even approximate equilibria may not exist. Nevertheless, we give an ecient
algorithm that either outputs an -equilibrium, or determines that the game
has no exact equilibria. More precisely, for M player games with a strategy
space dened as the convex hull of n vectors, that have -Lipschitz continuous
payo functions in the Lp norm, for p  2, and where  = max kxkp over all
x in the strategy space, we either compute an -equilibrium or determine that
no exact equilibrium exists in time O
 
MnMk+l

, where k = O
 
2Mp2
2

and
l = O
 
2p2
2

. Observe that this is a polynomial time algorithm when , p, ,
M , and  are constant.
To prove this result, we utilize a recent result of Barman [3], which states
that for every vector in a convex set, there is another vector that is  close to the
original in the Lp norm, and is a convex combination of b points on the convex
hull, where b depends on p and , but does not depend on the dimension. Using
this result, and the Lipschitz continuity of the payos, allows us to reduce the
task of nding an -equilibrium to checking only a small number of strategy pro-
les, and thus we get a brute-force algorithm that is reminiscent of the QPTAS
given by Lipton, Markakis, and Mehta for bimatrix games [16].
However, life is not so simple for us. Since we study a very general class of
games, verifying whether a given strategy prole is an -equilibrium is a non-
trivial task. It requires us to compute a regret for each player, which is the
dierence between the player's best response payo and their actual payo.
Computing a best response in a bimatrix game is trivial, but for Lipschitz games,
it may be a hard problem. We get around this problem by instead giving an
algorithm to compute approximate best responses. Hence we nd approximate
regrets, and it turns out that this is sucient for our algorithm to work.
Penalty games. We then turn our attention to penalty games. In these
games, the players play a strategic form game, and their utility is the payo
achieved in the game minus a penalty. The penalty function can be an arbitrary
function that depends on the player's strategy. This is a general class of games
that encompasses a number of games that have been studied before. The biased
games studied by Caragiannis, Kurokawa, and Procaccia [5] are penalty games
where the penalty is determined by the amount that a player deviates from a
specied base strategy. The biased model was studied in the past by psycholo-
gists [21] and it is close to what they call anchoring [6,14]. In their seminal paper,
Fiat and Papadimitriou [13] introduced a model for risk prone games, which re-
semble penalty games since the risk component can be encoded as a penalty.
Mavronicolas and Monien [17] followed this line of research and provided results
on the complexity of deciding if such games possess an equilibrium.
We again show that Lipschitz continuity helps us to nd approximate equilib-
ria. The only assumption that we make is that the penalty function is Lipschitz
continuous in an Lp norm with p  2. Again, this is a weak restriction, and it does
not guarantee that exact equilibria exist. Even so, we give a quasi-polynomial
time algorithm that either nds an -equilibrium, or veries that the game has
no exact equilibrium.
Our result can be seen as a generalisation of the QPTAS given by Lipton,
Markakis, and Mehta [16] for bimatrix games. Their approach is to show the
existence of an approximate equilibrium with a logarithmic support. They proved
this via the probabilistic method: if we know an exact equilibrium of a bimatrix
game, then we can take logarithmically many samples from the strategies, and
playing the sampled strategies uniformly will be an approximate equilibrium with
positive probability. We take a similar approach, but since our games are more
complicated, our proof is necessarily more involved. In particular, for Lipton,
Markakis, and Mehta, proving that the sampled strategies are an approximate
equilibrium only requires showing that the expected payo is close to the best
response payo. In penalty games, best response strategies are not necessarily
pure, and so the events that we must consider are more complex.
Distance biased games. Finally, we consider distance biased games, which
form a subclass of penalty games that have been studied recently by Caragiannis,
Kurokawa, and Procaccia [5]. They showed that, under very mild assumptions on
the bias function, biased games always have an exact equilibrium. Furthermore,
for the case where the bias function is either the L1 norm, or the L
2
2 norm, they
give an exponential time algorithm for nding an exact equilibrium.
Our results for penalty games already give a QPTAS for biased games, but
we are also interested in whether there are polynomial-time algorithms that can
nd non-trivial approximations. We give a positive answer to this question for
games where the bias is the L1 norm, the L
2
2 norm, or the L1 norm. We follow
the well-known approach of Daskalakis, Mehta, Papadimitriou [10], who gave a
simple algorithm for nding a 0:5-approximate equilibrium in a bimatrix game.
We show that this algorithm also works for biased games, although the gen-
eralisation is not entirely trivial. Again, this is because best responses cannot be
trivially computed in biased games. For the L1 and L1 norms, best responses
can be computed via linear programming, and for the L22 norm, best responses
can be formulated as a quadratic program, and it turns out that this partic-
ular QP can be solved in polynomial time by the ellipsoid method. However,
none of these algorithms are strongly polynomial. We show that, for each of the
norms, best responses can be found by a simple strongly-polynomial combina-
torial algorithm. We then analyse the quality of approximation provided by the
technique of Daskalakis, Mehta, Papadimitriou [10]. We obtain a strongly poly-
nomial algorithm for nding a 2=3 approximation in L1 and L1 biased games,
and a strongly polynomial algorithm for nding a 5=7 approximation in L22 bi-
ased games. For the latter result, in the special case where the bias function is
the inner product of the player's strategy we nd a 13=21 approximation.
2 Preliminaries
We start by xing some notation. For each positive integer n we use [n] to denote
the set f1; 2; : : : ; ng, we use n to denote the (n  1)-dimensional simplex, and
kxkp to denote the p-norm of a vector x 2 Rd, i.e. kxkp = (
P
i2[d] jxijp)1=p. Given
a set X = fx1; x2; : : : ; xng  Rd, we use conv(X) to denote the convex hull of
X. A vector y 2 conv(X) is said to be k-uniform with respect to X if there
exists a size k multiset S of [n] such that y = 1k
P
i2S xi. When X is clear from
the context we will simply say that a vector is k uniform without mentioning
that uniformity is with respect to X.
Games and strategies. A game with M players can be described by a set
of available actions for each player and a utility function for each player that
depends both on his chosen action and the actions the rest of the players chose.
For each player i 2 [M ] we use Si to denote his set of available actions and we
call it his strategy space. We will use xi 2 Si to denote a specic action chosen
by player i and we will call it as the strategy of player i. Furthermore, we use
x = (x1; : : : ; xM ) to denote a strategy prole of the game. We use Ti(xi;x i) to
denote the utility of player i when he plays the strategy xi and the rest of the
players play according to the strategy prole x i. A strategy x^i is a best response
against the strategy prole x i, if Ti(x^i;x i)  Ti(xi;x i) for all xi 2 Si. The
regret player i suers under a strategy prole x is the dierence between the
utility of his best response and his utility under x, i.e. Ti(x^i;x i)  Ti(xi;x i).
p-Lipschitz Games. We will use the notion of the p-Lipschitz continuity.
Denition 1 (p-Lipschitz). A function f : A ! R, with A  Rd is p-
Lipschitz continuous if for every x and y in A, it is true that jf(x)   f(y)j 
  kx  ykp.
We call the game L := (M;n; ; p; ; T ) p-Lipschitz if for each player i 2
[M ] the strategy space Si is the convex hull of n vectors y1; : : : ; yn in Rd,
maxxi2Si kxikp  , and the utility function Ti(x) 2 T is p-Lipschitz con-
tinuous.
Two Player Penalty Games. A two player penalty game P is dened by
a tuple
 
R;C; fr(x); fc(y)

, where (R;C) is a bimatrix game and fr(x) and fc(y)
are the penalty functions for the row and the column player respectively. The
utilities for the players under a strategy prole (x;y), denoted by Tr(x;y) and
Tc(x;y), are given by Tr(x;y) = x
TRy   fr(x) and Tc(x;y) = xTCy   fc(y).
We will use P to denote the set of two player penalty games with p-Lipschitz
penalty functions. A special class of penalty games is obtained when fr(x) = x
Tx
and fc(y) = y
Ty. We call these games as inner product penalty games.
Two Player Biased Games. This is a subclass of penalty games, where
extra constraints are added to the penalty functions fr(x) and fc(y) of the play-
ers. In this class of games there is a base strategy and for each player and the
penalty they receive is increasing with the distance between the strategy they
choose and their base strategy. Formally, the row player has a base strategy
p 2 n, the column player has a base strategy q and their strictly increasing
penalty functions are dened as fr(kx  pkst ) and fc(ky   qklm) respectively.
Two Player Distance Biased Games. This is a special class of biased
games where the penalty function is a fraction of the distance between the base
strategy of the player and his chosen strategy. Formally, a two player distance
biased game B is dened by a tuple  R;C; br(x;p); bc(y;q); dr; dc, where (R;C)
is a bimatrix game, p 2 n is a base strategy for the row player, q 2 n is a base
strategy for the column player, br(x;p) = kx pkst and bc(y;q) = ky qklm are
the penalty functions for the row and the column player respectively. The utilities
for the players under a strategy prole (x;y), denoted by Tr(x;y) and Tc(x;y),
are given by Tr(x;y) = x
TRy dr br(x;p) and Tc(x;y) = xTCy dc bc(y;q),
where dr and dc are non negative constants.
Solution Concepts. A strategy prole is an equilibrium if no player can
increase his utility by unilaterally changing his strategy. A relaxed version of this
concept is the approximate equilibrium, or -equilibrium, in which no player can
increase his utility more than  by unilaterally changing his strategy. Formally,
a strategy prole x is an -equilibrium in a game L if for every player i 2 [M ] it
holds that Ti(xi;x i)  Ti(x0i;x i)   for all x0i 2 Si.
In [7] it was proven that, unless P = PPAD, there is no FPTAS for comput-
ing an -NE in bimatrix games. The same result holds for the class of penalty
games where the penalty functions f for the players depend on n, the size of the
underlying bimatrix game, and limn!1 f = 0 for every player. Let P 0 to denote
this class of games.
Theorem 1. Unless P = PPAD, there is no FPTAS for computing an -equilibrium
in penalty games in P 0.
3 Approximate equilibria in p-Lipschitz games
In this section, we give an algorithm for computing approximate equilibria in
p Lipschitz games. Note that, our denition of a p-Lipschitz game does not
guarantee that an equilibrium always exists. Our technique can be applied ir-
respective of whether an exact equilibrium exists. If an exact equilibrium does
exist, then our technique will always nd an -equilibrium. If an exact equilib-
rium does not exist, then our algorithm either nds an -equilibrium or reports
that the game does not have an exact equilibrium.
We will utilize the following theorem that was recently proved by Barman [3].
Theorem 2 ( [3]). Given a set of vectors X = fx1; x2; : : : ; xng  Rd, let
conv(X) denote the convex hull of X. Furthermore, let  := maxx2X kxkp for
some 2  p < 1. For every  > 0 and every  2 conv(X), there exists an 4p22
uniform vector 0 2 conv(X) such that k  0kp  .
Combining Theorem 2 with the Denition 1 we get the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Let X = fx1; x2; : : : ; xng  Rd, let f : conv(X) ! R be a p-
Lipschitz continuous function for some 2  p <1, let  > 0 and let k = 42p22 ,
where  := maxx2X kxkp. Furthermore, let f(x) be the optimum value of f .
Then we can compute a k-uniform point x0 2 conv(X) in time O(nk), such that
jf(x)  f(x0)j < .
We now prove our result about Lipschitz games. In what follows we will
study a p-Lipschitz game L := (M;n; ; p; ; T ). Assuming the existence of an
exact Nash equilibrium, we establish the existence of a k-uniform approximate
equilibrium in the game L, where k depends on M;; p and . Note that 
depends heavily on p and the utility functions for the players.
Since by the denition of p-Lipschitz games the strategy space Si for every
player i is the convex hull of n vectors y1; : : : ; yn in Rd, any xi 2 Si can be
written as a convex combination of yjs. Hence, xi =
Pn
j=1 jyj , where j > 0
for every j 2 [n] and Pnj=1 j = 1. Then,  = (1; : : : ; n) is a probability
distribution over the vectors y1; : : : ; yn, i.e. vector yj is drawn with probability
j . Thus, we can sample a strategy xi by the probability distribution .
So, let x be an equilibrium for L and let x0 be a sampled uniform strategy
prole from x. For each player i we dene the following events
i =
jTi(x0i;x0 i)  Ti(xi ;x i)j < =2	
i =

Ti(xi;x
0
 i) < Ti(x
0
i;x
0
 i) + 
	
for all possible xi
 i =
n
kx0i   xi kp <

2M
o
for some p > 0:
Notice that if all the events i occur at the same time, then the sampled prole
x0 is an -equilibrium. We will show that if for a player i the events i and
T
j  j
hold, then the event i is also true.
Lemma 2. For all i 2 [M ] it holds that Tj2[M ]  j \ i  i.
We are ready to prove the main result of the section.
Theorem 3. In any game p-Lipschitz game L that posses an equilibrium and
any  > 0, there is a k-uniform strategy prole, with k = 16M
22p2
2 that is an
-equilibrium.
Theorem 3 establishes the existence of a k-uniform approximate equilibrium,
but this does not immediately give us our approximation algorithm. The obvious
approach is to perform a brute force check of all k-uniform strategies, and then
output the one the provides the best approximation. There is a problem with this,
however, since computing the quality of approximation requires us to compute
the regret for each player, which in turn requires us to compute a best response
for each player. Computing an exact best response in a Lipschitz game is a hard
problem in general, since we make no assumptions about the utility functions of
the players. Fortunately, it is sucient to instead compute an approximate best
response for each player, and Lemma 1 can be used to do this.
Lemma 3. Let x be a strategy prole for a p-Lipschitz game L, and let x^i be
a best response for player i against the prole x i. There is a 4
2p2
2 -uniform
strategy x0i that is an -best response against x i.
Our goal is to approximate the approximation guarantee for a given strategy
prole. More formally, given a strategy prole x that is an -equilibrium, and a
constant  > 0, we want an algorithm that outputs a number within the range
[   ;  + ]. Lemma 3 allows us to do this. For a given strategy prole x, we
rst compute -approximate best responses for each player, then we can use
these to compute -approximate regrets for each player. The maximum over the
-approximate regrets then gives us an approximation of  with a tolerance of .
This is formalised in the following algorithm.
Algorithm 1. Evaluation of approximation guarantee
Input: A strategy prole x for L, and a constant  > 0.
Output: An additive -approximation of the approximation guarantee
(x) for the strategy prole x.
1. Set l = 4
2p2
2 .
2. For every player i 2 [M ]
(a) For every l-uniform strategy x0i of player i compute Ti(x
0
i;x i).
(b) Set m = maxx0i Ti(x
0
i;x i).
(c) Set Ri(x) = m   Ti(xi;x i).
3. Set (x) =  +maxi2[M ]Ri(x).
4. Return (x).
Utilising the above algorithm, we can now produce an algorithm to nd an
approximate equilibrium in Lipschitz games. The algorithm checks all k-uniform
strategy proles, using the value of k given by Theorem 3, and for each one,
computes an approximation of the quality approximation using the algorithm
given above.
Algorithm 2. 3-equilibrium for p-Lipschitz game L
Input: Game L and  > 0.
Output: An 3-equilibrium for L.
1. Set k > 16
2Mp2
2 .
2. For every k-uniform strategy prole x0
(a) Compute an -approximation of (x0).
(b) If the -approximation of (x0) is less than 2, return x0.
If the algorithm returns a strategy prole x, then it must be a 3 equilibrium.
This is because we check that an -approximation of (x) is less than 2, and
therefore (x)  3. Secondly, we argue that if the game has an exact Nash equi-
librium, then this procedure will always output a 3-approximate equilibrium.
From Theorem 3 we know that if k > 16
2Mp2
2 , then there is a k-uniform strat-
egy prole x that is an -equilibrium for L. When we apply our approximate
regret algorithm to x, to nd an -approximation of (x), the algorithm will
return a number that is less than 2, hence x will be returned by the algorithm.
To analyse the running time, observe that there are
 
n+k 1
k

= O(nk) possible
k-uniform strategies for each player, thus O(nMk) k-uniform strategy proles.
Furthermore, our regret approximation algorithm runs in time O(Mnl), where
l = 4
2p2
2 . Hence, we get the next theorem.
Theorem 4. Given a p-Lipschitz game L that posses an equilibrium and any
 > 0, a 3-equilibrium can be computed in time O
 
MnMk+l

, where k =
O
 
2Mp2
2

and l = O
 
2p2
2

.
Although it might be hard to decide whether a game has an equilibrium, our
algorithm can be applied in any p-Lipschitz game. Notice that our algorithm
never uses the fact that the game posses an equilibrium. If the game does not
posses an exact equilibrium then our algorithm either nds an approximate
equilibrium or determines that the game does not posses an exact equilibrium.
Theorem 5. For any game p-Lipschitz game L in time O
 
MnMk+l

, we can
either compute a 3-equilibrium, or decide that L does not posses an exact equi-
librium, where k = O
 
2Mp2
2

and l = O
 
2p2
2

.
4 A quasi-polynomial algorithm for penalty games
In this section we present an algorithm that, for any  > 0, can compute an
-equilibrium for any penalty game in P that posses one in quasi-polynomial
time. For the algorithm, we take the same approach as we did in the previous
section for Lipschitz games: we show that if an exact equilibrium exists, then a
k-uniform approximate equilibrium always exists too, and provide a brute-force
search algorithm for nding it. Once again, since best response computation may
be hard for this class of games, we must provide an approximation algorithm for
nding the quality of an approximate equilibrium.
We rst focus on penalty games that posses an exact equilibrium. So, let
(x;y) be an equilibrium of the game and let (x0;y0) be a k-uniform strategy
prole sampled from this equilibrium. We dene the following four events:
r =
jTr(x0;y0)  Tr(x;y)j < =2	
r =

Tr(x;y
0) < Tr(x0;y0) + 
	
for all x
c =
jTc(x0;y0)  Tc(x;y)j < =2	
c =

Tc(x
0;y) < Tc(x0;y0) + 
	
for all y:
The goal is to derive a value for k such that all the four events above are true,
or equivalently Pr(r \ r \ c \ r) > 0.
Note that in order to prove that (x0;y0) is an -equilibrium we only have to
consider the events r and c. Nevertheless, as we show in Lemma 4, the events
r and c are crucial in our analysis. The proof of the main theorem boils down
to the events r and c.
We will focus only on the row player, since the same analysis can be applied
to the column player. Firstly we study the event r.
Lemma 4. For all penalty games it holds that Pr(cr)  n  e 
k2
2 + Pr(cr).
With Lemma 4 in hand, we can see that in order to compute a value for k it
is sucient to study the event r. We introduce the following auxiliary events
that we will study separately: ru =
jx0TRy0   xTRyj < =4	 and rb =jfr(x0)  fr(x)j < =4	. It is easy to see that if both rb and ru are true, then
the event r must be true too. So we have rb \ ru  r. Using the analysis
from [16] we can prove that Pr(cru)  2e 
k2
8 . Finally, we must prove an upper
bound on the event crb, which we provide in the following lemma.
Lemma 5. Pr(crb)  8
p
p

p
k
.
Let us dene the event GOOD = r \ c \ r \ c. To prove our theorem it
suces to prove that Pr(GOOD) > 0. Notice that for the events c and c the
same analysis as for r and r can be used. Then, using Lemma 4, Lemma 5
and the analysis for ru we get that Pr(GOOD
c) < 1 for the chosen value of k.
Theorem 6. For any equilibrium (x;y) of a penalty game from the class P,
any  > 0, and any k 2 
(2 logn)2 , there exists a k-uniform strategy prole
(x0;y0) that:
1. (x0;y0) is an -equilibrium for the game,
2. jTr(x0;y0)  Tr(x;y)j < =2,
3. jTc(x0;y0)  Tc(x;y)j < =2.
Theorem 6 establishes the existence of a k-uniform strategy prole (x0;y0)
that is an -equilibrium, but as before, we must provide an ecient method for
approximating the quality of approximation provided by a given strategy prole.
To do so, we rst give the following lemma, which shows that approximate best
responses can be computed in quasi-polynomial time for penalty games.
Lemma 6. Let (x;y) be a strategy prole for a penalty game P, and let x^ be a
best response against y. There is an l-uniform strategy x0, with l = 17
2pp
2 , that
is an -best response against y, i.e. Tr(x^;y) < Tr(x
0;y) + .
Having given this lemma, we can reuse Algorithm 1, but with l set equal to
172
p
p
2 , to provide an algorithm that aproximates the quality of approximation
of a given strategy prole. Then, we can reuse Algorithm 2 with k = 
(
2 logn)
2
to provide a quasi-polynomial time algorithm that nds approximate equilibia
in penalty games. Notice again that our algorithm can be applied in games in
which it is computationally hard to verify whether an exact equilibrium exists.
Our algorithm either will compute an approximate equilibrium or it will fail to
nd one, in which case the game does not posses an exact equilibrium.
Theorem 7. In any penalty game P and any  > 0, in quasi polynomial time
we can either compute a 3-equilibrium, or decide that P does not posses an
exact equilibrium.
5 Distance Biased Games
In this section, we focus on three particular classes of distance biased games, and
we provide polynomial-time approximation algorithms when the penalty function
is one of the L1; L
2
2 and L1 norm. Our approach is to follow the technique of
Daskalakis, Mehta, Papadimitriou [10] that nds a 0:5-NE in a bimatrix game.
The algorithm that we will use for all three penalty functions is given below.
Algorithm 4. The Base Algorithm
1. Compute a best response y against p.
2. Compute a best response x against y.
3. Set x =   p+ (1  )  x, for some  2 [0; 1].
4. Return the strategy prole (x;y).
While this is a well-known technique for bimatrix games, it cannot immedi-
ately be applied to penalty games, because the algorithm requires us to compute
two best responses. While computing a best-response is trivial in bimatrix games,
this is not the case for penalty games. Best responses for L1 and L1 penalties can
be computed in polynomial-time via linear programming, and for L22 penalties,
the ellipsoid algorithm can be applied to a specialized quadratic program. How-
ever, these methods work as black boxes and do not provide strongly polynomial
algorithms.
For each of the penalties we develop a simple combinatorial algorithm for
computing best response strategies. We use the nature of these penalty functions
and we provide strongly polynomial algorithms that compute best responses.
More specically, for the L1 and L1 norms we compute the exact probability
each pure strategy should be played in a best response by studying how the
utility function increases. For the L22 norm we use the KKT conditions of a
quadratic program to produce a closed formula for the solution. Our algorithms,
which are strongly polynomial, allow us to optimize the value of , and produce
the following approximation guarantees.
Theorem 8. In biased games with L1; L
2
2 and L1 penalties a 2=3; 5=7 and 2=3-
equilibrium respectively can be computed in polynomial time. For inner product
games the approximation guarantee is 13=21.
6 Conclusions
We have studied games with innite action spaces, and non-linear payo func-
tions. We have shown that Lipschitz continuity of the payo function can be
exploited to provide approximation algorithms. For Lipschitz games, Lipschitz
continuity of the payo function allows us to provide an ecient algorithm for
nding approximate equilibria. For penalty games, Lipschitz continuity of the
penalty function allows us to provide a QPTAS. Finally, we provided strongly
polynomial approximation algorithms for L1, L
2
2, and L1 distance biased games.
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A Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. For the sake of contradiction suppose that there is an FPTAS for com-
puting an -equilibrium for penalty games in P 0. Then given an n  n bima-
trix game (R;C), dene the penalty game
 
R;C; fr(x); fc(y)

from the fam-
ily P 0 where limn!1 fr(x) = 0 and limn!1 fc(y) = 0. Let (x;y) be an -
equilibrium for the penalty game. This means that for all x0 2 n it holds that
x
T
Ry  fr(x)  x0TRy  fr(x0)   or, equivalently, xTRy  x0TRy  0,
where 0 =  + fr(x)   fr(x0). Similarly, xTCy  xTCy0   00, where 00 =
 + fc(y
)   fr(y0). But 0 = 00 =  when n ! 1. Hence (x;y) is a -NE for
the bimatrix game (R;C). This means that if there is an FPTAS for computing
an -equilibrium in a penalty game in P 0 then there is an FPTAS for computing
an -NE in (R;C) which is a contradiction, unless P = PPAD. ut
B Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. From Theorem 2 we know that for the chosen value of k there exists a
k-uniform point x0 such that kx0   xkp < =. Since the function f(x) is p-
Lipschitz continuous, we get that jf(x0)   f(x)j < . In order to compute this
point we have to exhaustively evaluate the function f in all k-uniform points
and choose the point that it maximizes/minimizes its value. Since there are 
n+k 1
k

= O(nk) possible k-uniform points, the theorem follows. ut
C Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. Suppose that both events i and
T
j  j2[M ] hold. We will show that
the event i must be true too. Let xi be an arbitrary strategy, let x

 i be a
strategy prole for the rest of the players, and let x0 i be a sampled strategy
prole from x i. Since we assume that the events  j is true for all j we get
kx0 i   x ikp 
P
j 6=i kx0j   xjkp we get that
kx0 i   x ikp 
X
j 6=i
kx0j   xjkp

X
j 6=i

2M
 
2
:
Furthermore, since by assumption the utility functions for the players are p-
Lipschitz continuous we have thatTi(xi;x0 i)  Ti(xi;x i)  2 :
This means that
Ti(xi;x
0
 i)  Ti(xi;x i) +

2
 Ti(xi ;x i) +

2
(1)
since Ti(x

i ;x

 i)  Ti(xi;x i) for all possible xi; the strategy prole (xi ;x i)
is an equilibrium of the game. Furthermore, since by assumption the event i is
true we get that
Ti(x

i ;x

 i) < Ti(x
0
i;x
0
 i) +

2
: (2)
Hence, if we combine the inequalities (1) and (2) we get that Ti(xi;x
0
 i) <
Ti(x
0
i;x
0
 i)+  for all possible xi. Thus, if the events i and  j for every j 2 [M ]
hold, then the event i holds too. ut
D Proof of Theorem 3
Proof. In order to prove the claim, it suces to show that there is a strategy
prole where every player plays a k-uniform strategy, for the chosen value of
k, such that the events i hold for all i 2 [M ]. Since the utility functions in
L are p-Lipschitz continuous it holds that
T
i2[n]  i 
T
i2[n] i. Furthermore,
combining that with Lemma 2 we get that
T
i2[n]  i 
T
i2[n] i. Thus, if the
event  i is true for every i 2 [n], then the event
T
i2[n] i is true as well.
From Theorem 2 we get that for each i 2 [M ] there is a 16M22p22 -uniform
point x0i such that the event  i occurs with positive probability. The claim
follows. ut
E Proof of Lemma 4
Proof. We begin by introducing the following auxiliary events for all i 2 [n]
 ri =

Riy
0 < Riy +

2
	
:
We prove how the events  ri and the event r are related with the event r.
Assume that the event r and the events  ri for all i 2 [n] are true . Let x be
any mixed strategy for the row player. Since by assumption Riy
0 < Riy + 2
and since x is a probability distribution, it holds that xTRy0 < xTRy+ 2 . If we
subtract fr(x) from each side we get that x
TRy0 fr(x) < xTRy fr(x)+ 2 . This
means that Tr(x;y
0) < Tr(x;y) + 2 for all x. But we know that Tr(x;y
) 
Tr(x
;y) for all x 2 n, since (x;y) is an equilibrium. Thus, we get that
Tr(x;y
0) < Tr(x;y) + 2 for all possible x. Furthermore, since the event r
is true too, we get that Tr(x;y
0) < Tr(x0;y0) + . Thus, if the events r and
 ri for all i 2 [n] are true, then the event r must be true as well. Formally,
r
T
i2[n]  ri  r. Thus, Pr(cr)  Pr(cr)+
P
i  ri. Using the Hoeding bound,
we get that Pr( cri)  e 
k2
2 for all i 2 [n]. Our claim follows. ut
F Proof of Lemma 5
Proof. Since we assume that the penalty function fr(x
0) is p-Lipschitz contin-
uous the event rb can be replaced by the event rb0 =
kx0   xkp < =4	. It
is easy to see that rb  rb0 . Then, using the proof of Theorem 2 from [3] we
get that E[kx0   xkp]  2
p
pp
k
. Thus, using Markov's inequality we get that
Pr(kx0   xkp  
4
)  E[kx
0   xkp]

4
 8
p
p

p
k
:
ut
G Proof of Theorem 6
Proof.
Pr(GOODc)  Pr(cr) + Pr(cr) + Pr(cc) + Pr(cc)
 2 Pr(cr) + Pr(cr)
 2 2Pr(cr) + n  e  k22  (from Lemma 4)
 2 2Pr(cru) + 2Pr(crb0) + n  e  k22 
 2 4e  k28 + 8pp

p
k
+ n  e  k
2
2

(from Lemma 5)
< 1 for the chosen value of k:
Hence, Pr(GOOD) > 0 and our claim follows. ut
H Proof of Lemma 6
Proof. We will prove that jTr(x^;y) Tr(x0;y)j <  which implies our claim. Let
1 = fjx^TRy   x0TRyj  =2g and 2 = fjfr(x^)   fr(x0)j < =2g Notice that
Lemma 5 does not use anywhere the fact that x is an equilibrium strategy,
thus it holds even if x is replaced by x^. Thus, Pr(c2)  4
p
p

p
k
. Furthermore,
using the analysis from [16] again, we can prove that Pr(c1)  2e 
k2
4 and using
similar arguments as in the proof of Theorem 6 it can be easily proved that for
the chosen of l it holds that Pr(c1) + Pr(
c
2) < 1, thus the events 1 and 2
occur with positive probability and our claim follows. ut
I Distance Biased Games
In this section, we focus on three particular classes of distance biased games,
and we provide polynomial-time approximation algorithms for these games. We
focus on the following three penalty functions:
{ L1 penalty: br(x;p) = kx  pk1 =
P
i jxi   pij.
{ L22 penalty: br(x;p) = kx  pk22 =
P
i(xi   pi)2.
{ L1 penalty: br(x;p) = kx  pk1 = maxi jxi   pij.
Our approach is to follow the well-known technique of [10] that nds a 0:5-
NE in a bimatrix game. The algorithm that we will use for all three penalty
functions is given below.
Algorithm 4. The Base Algorithm
1. Compute a best response y against p.
2. Compute a best response x against y.
3. Set x =   p+ (1  )  x, for some  2 [0; 1].
4. Return the strategy prole (x;y).
While this is a well-known technique for bimatrix games, note that it can-
not immediately be applied to penalty games. This is because the algorithm
requires us to compute two best response strategies, and while computing a
best-response is trivial in bimatrix games, this is not the case for penalty games.
Best responses for L1 and L1 penalties can be computed in polynomial-time via
linear programming, and for L22 penalties, the ellipsoid algorithm can be applied.
However, these methods do not provide strongly polynomial algorithms.
In this section, for each of the penalties, we develop a simple combinatorial
algorithm for computing best response strategies for each of these penalties.
Our algorithms are strongly polynomial. Then, we determine the quality of the
approximation given by the base algorithm when our best response techniques
are used. In what follows we make the common assumption that the payos of
the underlying bimatrix game (R;C) are in [0; 1].
I.1 A 2/3-approximation algorithm for L1-biased games
We start by considering L1-biased games. Suppose that we want to compute
a best-response for the row player against a xed strategy y of the column
player. We will show that best response strategies in L1-biased games have a
very particular form: if b is the best response strategy in the (unbiased) bimatrix
game (R;C), then the best-response places all of its probability on b except for
a certain set of rows S where it is too costly to shift probability away from p.
The rows i 2 S will be played with pi to avoid taking the penalty for deviating.
The characterisation for whether it is too expensive to shift away from p is
given by the following lemma.
Lemma 7. Let j be a pure strategy, let k be a pure strategy with pk > 0, and
let x be a strategy with xk = pk. The utility for the row player increases when
we shift probability from k to j if and only if Rjy  Rky   2dr > 0.
Proof. Suppose that we shift  probability from k to j, where  2 (0;pk]. Then
the utility for the row player is equal to Tr(x;y) +   (Rjy Rky  2dr), where
the nal term is the penalty for shifting away from k. Thus, the utility for the
row player increases under this shift if and only if Rjy  Rky   2dr > 0. ut
Observe that, if we are able to shift probability away from a strategy k, then
we should obviously shift it to a best response strategy for the (unbiased) bima-
trix game, since this strategy maximizes the increase in our payo. Hence, our
characterisation of best response strategies is correct. This gives us the following
simple algorithm for computing best responses.
Algorithm 5. Best Response Algorithm for L1 penalty
1. Set S = 0.
2. Compute a best response b against y in the unbiased bimatrix game
(R;C).
3. For each index i 6= b in the range 1  i  n:
(a) If Rb  y  Ri  y   2dr  0, then set xi = pi and S = S + pi.
(b) Otherwise set xi = 0
4. Set xb = 1  S.
5. Return x.
Our characterisation has a number of consequences. Firstly, it can be seen
that if dr  1=2, then there is no protable shift of probability between any two
pure strategies, since 0  Riy  1 for all i 2 [n]. Thus, we get the following
corollary.
Corollary 1. If dr  1=2, then p is a dominant strategy.
Moreover, since we can compute a best response in polynomial time we get the
next theorem.
Theorem 9. In biased games with L1 penalty functions and maxfdr; dcg  1=2,
an equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time.
Finally, using the characterization of best responses we can see that there
is a connection between the equilibria of the distance biased game and the well
supported Nash equilibria (WSNE) of the underlying bimatrix game.
Theorem 10. Let B =  R;C; br(x;p); bc(y;q); dr; dc be a distance biased game
with L1 penalties and let d := maxfdr; dcg. Any equilirbium of B is a 2d-WSNE
for the bimatrix game (R;C).
Proof. Let (x;y) be an equilibrium for B. From the best response Algorithm
for L1 penalty games we can see that x

i > 0 if and only if Rby Riy 2dr  0,
where b is a pure best response against y. This means that for every i 2 [n]
with xi > 0, it holds that Ri y  maxj2[n]Rj y 2d. Similarly, it holds that
CTi x  maxj2[n] CTj x  2d for all i 2 [n] with yi > 0. This is the denition
of a 2d-WSNE for the bimatrix game (R;C). ut
Approximation algorithm We now analyse the approximation guarantee pro-
vided by the base algorithm for L1-biased games. So, let (x
;y) be the strategy
prole the is returned by the base algorithm. Since we have already shown that
exact Nash equilibria can be found in games with either dc  1=2 or dr  1=2,
we will assume that both dc and dr are less than 1=2, since this is the only
interesting case.
We start by considering the regret of the row player. The following lemma
will be used in the analysis of all three of our approximation algorithms.
Lemma 8. Under the strategy prole (x;y) the regret for the row player is at
most .
Proof. Notice that for all i 2 [n] we have
jpi + (1  )xi   pij = (1  )jxi   pij;
hence kx pk1 = (1 )kx pk1 and kx pk1 = (1 )kx pk1. Furthermore,
notice that
P
i
 
(1   )xi + pi   pi
2
= (1   )2kx   pk22, thus kx   pk22 
(1   )kx   pk22. Hence the payo for the row player it holds Tr(x;y) 
 Tr(p;y)+(1  ) Tr(x;y) and his regret under the strategy prole (x;y)
is
Rr(x;y) = max
~x
Tr(~x;y
)  Tr(x;y)
= Tr(x;y
)  Tr(x;y) (since x is a best response against y)
  Tr(x;y)  Tr(p;y)
  (since max
x
Tr(x;y
)  1 and Tr(p;y)  0):
ut
Next, we consider the regret of the column player. The following lemma will
be used for both the L1 case and the L1 case. Observe that in the L1 case, the
precondition of dc bc(y;q)  1 always holds, since we have ky qk1  2, thus
dc  bc(y;q)  1 since we are only interested in the case where dc  1=2.
Lemma 9. If dc  bc(y;q)  1, then under strategy prole (x;y) the column
player suers at most 2  2 regret.
Proof. The regret of the column player under the strategy prole (x;y) is
Rc(x;y) = max
y
Tc(x
;y)  Tc(x;y)
= max
y
n
(1  )Tc(x;y) + Tc(p;y)
o  (1  )Tc(x;y)  Tc(p;y)
 (1  ) max
y
Tc(x
;y)  Tc(x;y)

(since y is a best response against p)
 (1  )(1 + dc  bc(y;q)) (since max
x
Tc(x
;y)  1)
 (1  )  2 (since dc  bc(y;q)  1):
ut
To complete the analysis, we must select a value for  that equalises the two
regrets. It can easily be veried that setting  = 2=3 ensures that  = 2   2,
and so we have the following theorem.
Theorem 11. In biased games with L1 penalties a 2/3-equilibrium can be com-
puted in polynomial time.
I.2 A 5/7-approximation algorithm for L22-biased games
We now turn our attention to biased games with an L22 penalty. Again, we start
by giving a combinatorial algorithm for nding a best response. Throughout this
section, we x y as a column player strategy, and we will show how to compute
a best response for the row player.
Best responses in L22-biased games can be found by solving a quadratic pro-
gram, and actually this particular quadratic program can be solved via the ellip-
soid algorithm [15]. We will give a simple combinatorial algorithm that uses the
Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions, and produces a closed formula for the
solution. Hence, we will obtain a strongly polynomial time algorithm for nding
best responses.
Our algorithm can be applied on L22 penalty functions and any value dr, but
for notation simplicity we describe our method for dr = 1. Furthermore, we dene
i := Riy+2pi and we call i as the payo of pure strategy i. Then, the utility
for the row player can be written as Tr(x;y) =
Pn
i=1 xi  i  
Pn
i=1 x
2
i   pTp.
Notice that the term pTp is a constant and it does not aect the solution of
the best response; so we can exclude it from our computations. Thus, a best
response for the row player against strategy y is the solution of the following
quadratic program
maximize
nX
i=1
xi  i  
nX
i=1
x2i
subject to
nX
i=1
xi = 1
xi  0 for all i 2 [n]:
The Lagrangian function for this problem is
L(x;y; ;u) =
nX
i=1
xi  i  
nX
i=1
x2i   (
nX
i=1
xi   1) 
nX
i=1
uixi
and the corresponding KKT conditions
i     2xi   ui = 0 for all i 2 [n] (3)
nX
i=1
xi = 1 (4)
xi  0 for all i 2 [n] (5)
xi  ui = 0 for all i 2 [n]: (6)
Constraints (3)-(5) are the stationarity conditions and (6) are the complemen-
tarity slackness conditions. We say that strategy x is a feasible response if it
satises the KKT conditions. The obvious way to compute a best response is by
exhaustively checking all 2n possible combinations for the complementarity con-
ditions and choose the feasible response that maximizes the utility for a player.
Next we prove how we can bypass the brute force technique and compute all
best responses in polynomial time.
In what follows, without loss of generality, we assume that 1  : : :  n.
That is, the pure strategies are ordered according to their payos. In the next
lemma we prove that in every best response, if a player plays pure strategy l
with positive probability, then he must play every pure strategy k with k < l
with positive probability.
Lemma 10. In every best response x if xl > 0 then x

k > 0 for all k < l.
Proof. For the sake of contradiction suppose that there is a best response x
and a k < l such that xl > 0 and x

k = 0. Let us denote M =
P
i 6=fl;kg i  xi  P
i 6=fl;kg x
2
i . Suppose now that we shift some probability, denoted by , from
pure strategy l to pure strategy k. Then his utility is Tr(x
;y) =M +l  (xl  
)  (xl   )2 + k     2, which is maximized for  = k l+2x

l
4 . Notice that
 > 0 since k  l and xl > 0, thus the row player can increase his utility by
assigning positive probability to pure strategy k which contradicts the fact that
x is a best response. ut
Lemma 10 implies that there are only n possible supports that a best response
can use. Indeed, we can exploit the KKT conditions to derive, for each candidate
support, the exact probability that each pure strategy would be played. We
derive the probability as a function of is and of the support size. Suppose that
the KKT conditions produce a feasible response when we set the support to have
size k. From condition (3) we get that xi =
1
2 (i   ) for all 1  i  k and zero
else. But we know that
Pk
j xj = 1. Thus we get that
Pk
j=1
1
2 (j   ) = 1 and if
we solve for  get that  =
Pk
j=1 j 2
k . This means that for all i 2 [k] we get
xi =
1
2
 
i  
Pk
j=1 j   2
k
!
: (7)
So, our algorithm does the following. It loops through all n candidate sup-
ports for a best response. For each one, it uses Equation (7) to determine the
probabilities, and then checks whether these satisfy the KKT conditions, and
thus if this is a feasible response. If it is, then it is saved for in a list of feasible
responses, otherwise it is discarded. After all n possibilities have been checked,
the feasible response with the highest payo is then returned.
Algorithm 6. Best Response Algorithm for L22 penalty
1. For i = 1 : : : n
(a) Set x1  : : :  xi > 0 and xi+1 = : : : = xn = 0.
(b) Check if there is a feasible response under these constraints.
(c) If so, add it to the list of feasible responses.
2. Among the feasible responses choose one with the highest utility.
Approximation Algorithm We now show that the base algorithm gives a 5/7-
approximation when applied to L22-penalty games. For the row player's regret,
we can use Lemma 8 to show that the regret is bounded by . However, for the
column player's regret, things are more involved. We will show that the regret of
the column player is at most 2:5 2:5. That analysis depends on the maximum
entry of the base strategy q and more specically on whether maxkfqkg  1=2
or not.
Lemma 11. If maxkfqkg  1=2, then the regret the column player suers under
strategy prole (x;y) is at most 2:5  2:5.
Proof. Note that when maxkfqkg  1=2, then bc = ky   pk22  1:5 for all
possible y. Then, using the analysis from Lemma 9, along with the fact that
dc  bc(y;q)  2 for L22 penalties, and since by assumption dc = 1, the claim
follows. ut
For the case where there is a k such that qk > 1=2 a more involved analysis
is needed. The rst goal is to prove that under any strategy y that is a best
response against p the pure strategy k is played with positive probability. In
order to prove that, rst it is proven that there is a feasible response against
strategy p where pure strategy k is played with positive probability. In what
follows we denote i := C
T
i p+ 2qi.
Lemma 12. Let qk > 1=2 for some k 2 [n]. Then there is a feasible response
where pure strategy k is played with positive probability.
Proof. Note that k > 1 since by assumption qk > 1=2. Recall from Equation (7)
that in a feasible response y it holds that yi =
1
2

i  
Pk
j=1 j 2
k

.
In order to prove the claim it is sucient to show that yk > 0 when in
the KKT conditions is set yi > 0 for all i 2 [k]. Or equivalently, to show that
k  
Pk
j=1 j 2
k =
1
k
 
(k   1)k + 2 
Pk 1
j=1 j

> 0. But,
(k   1)k + 2 
k 1X
j=1
j > k + 1 
k 1X
j=1
 
CTx+ 2qi

(since k > 1)
 k + 1  (k   1) 
k 1X
j=1
2qi
 1 + qk (since q 2 n)
> 0:
The claim follows. ut
Next it is proven that the utility of the column player is increasing when he
adds pure strategies i in his support such that i > 1.
Lemma 13. Let yk and yk+1 be two feasible responses with support size k and
k + 1 respectively, where k+1 > 1. Then Tc(x;y
k+1) > Tc(x;y
k).
Proof. Let yk be a feasible response with support size k for the column player
against strategy p and let (k) :=
Pk
j=1 j 2
2k . Then the utility of the column
player when he plays yk can be written as
Tc(x;y
k) =
nX
i=1
yki  i  
nX
i=1
(xki )
2   qTq
=
kX
i=1
yki
 
i   yki
  qTq
=
kX
i=1
i
2
  (k)
i
2
+ (k)

  qTq
=
1
4
kX
i=1
2i   k 
 
(k)
2   qTq:
The goal now is to prove that Tc(x;y
k+1)   Tc(x;yk) > 0. By the previous
analysis for Tc(x;y
k) and if A :=
Pk
i=1 i   2, then
Tc(x;y
k+1)  Tc(x;yk) = 1
4
k+1X
i=1
2i   (k + 1)
 
(k + 1)
2   1
4
kX
i=1
2i + k 
 
(k)
2
=
1
4

2k+1 +
A2
k
  (A+ k+1)
2
k + 1

=
1
4

2k+1 +
1
k + 1
(A2   2k+1   2Ak+1)

=
1
4(k + 1)
 
k2k+1 +A
2   2Ak+1

>
1
4(k + 1)
 
k +A2   2A (since 1 < k+1  2 and A > k   2)
>
1
4(k + 1)
 
k2   5k + 8 (since A > k   2)
> 0:
ut
Notice that k  2pk > 1. Thus, the utility of the feasible response that assigns
positive probability to pure strategy k is strictly greater than the utility of any
feasible responses that does not assign probability to k. Thus strategy k is always
played in a best response. Hence, the next lemma follows.
Lemma 14. If there is a k 2 [n] such that qk > 1=2, then in every best response
y the pure strategy k is played with positive probability.
Using now Lemma 14 we can provide a better bound for the regret the column
player suers, since in every best response y the pure strategy k is played with
positive probability.
Lemma 15. Let y be a best response when there is a pure strategy k with
qk > 1=2. Then the regret for the column player under strategy prole (x
;y)
is bounded by 2  2.
Proof. Before we proceed with our analysis we assume without loss of generality
that k = 1. Recall from the analysis for the Algorithm 1 that the regret for the
column player is
Rc(x;y)  (1  )

max
~y2
fx^TC~yg+ 2~yTqk   2yT q+ yT y

 (1  ) 1 + 2qk   2yT q+ yT y: (8)
We focus now on the term y
T
y   2yT q. It can be proven 3 that yT y  
2y
T
q  1  2qk. Thus, from (8) we get that Rc(x;y)  2  2. ut
3 Appendix J
Recall now that the regret for the row player is bounded by , so if we optimize
with respect to  the regrets are equal for  = 2=3. Thus, the next theorem
follows, since when the there is a k with qk > 1=2 the Algorithm 1 produces a
2=3-equilibrium. Hence, combining this with Lemma 11 and Theorem 12 follows
for  = 5=7.
Theorem 12. In biased games with L22 penalties a 5=7-equilibrium can be com-
puted in polynomial time.
I.3 Inner product penalty games
We observe that we can also tackle the case where the penalty function is the
inner product of the strategy played, i.e. p = q = 0. For these games, that
we call inner product penalty games, we replace p as the starting point of the
base algorithm with the fully mixed strategy xn. Hence, for that case x =
  xn + (1   )  x for some  2 [0; 1]. Again, the regret the row player suers
under strategy prole (x;y) is bounded by .
Lemma 16. When the penalty function is the inner product of the strategy
played, then the regret for the row player under strategy prole (x;y) is bounded
by .
Furthermore, using similar analysis as in Lemma 9 it can be proven that the
regret for the column player under strategy prole (x;y) is bounded by (1  
)(1 + dc  yT y). For the column player we will distinguish between the cases
where dc  1=2 and dc > 1=2. For the rst case where dc  1=2 it is easy see that
the algorithm produces a 0.6-equilibrium. For the other case, when dc > 1=2,
rst it is proven that there is no pure best response.
Lemma 17. If the penalty for the column player is equal to yTy and dc >
1
2 ,
then there is no pure best response against any strategy of the row player.
Proof. Let Cj to denote the payo of the column player from his j-th pure
strategy against some strategy x played by the row player. For the sake of
contradiction, assume that there is a pure best response for the column player
where, without loss of generality, he plays only his rst pure strategy. Suppose
now that he shifts some probability to his second strategy, that is he plays
the rst pure strategy with probability x and the second pure strategy with
probability 1  x. The utility for the column player under this mixed strategy is
x C1+(1 x) C2  dc  (x2+(1 x)2), which is maximized for x = 2dc+C1 C24dc .
Notice that x > 0, which means that the column player can deviate from the
pure strategy and increase his utility. The claim follows. ut
With Lemma 17 in hand, it can be proven that when dc > 1=2 the column
player does not play any pure strategy with probability greater than 3/4.
Lemma 18. If dc > 1=2, then in y
 no pure strategy is played with probability
greater than 3/4.
Proof. For the sake of contradiction suppose that there is a pure strategy i
in y that is played with probability greater than 3/4. Furthermore, let k be
the support size of y. From Lemma 17, since dc > 1=2, we know that there
is no pure best response, thus k  2. Then using Equation (7) we get that
3
4 <
1
2
 
i  
Pk
j=1 j 2
k

. If we solve for j we get that i >
3k 4
2k 2 > 1 which is a
contradiction since when q = 0 it holds that i = C
T
i x  1. ut
A direct corollary from Lemma 18 is that y
T
y  5=8. Hence, we can prove the
following lemma.
Lemma 19. Under strategy prole (x;y) the regret for the column player is
bounded by 138 (1  ).
Proof. Firstly, note that Tc(x
;y) = xn
T
Cy+(1  )xTCy yT y. More-
over, max~y2fxnTC~y   ~yT ~yg   Tc(xn;y) = 0, since y is a best response
against xn. Finally, notice that 0  yTy  1 for all y. Thus, the regret for the
column player is
Rc(x;y) = (1  )

max
~y2
fxTC~y   ~yT ~yg   xTCy + yT y

< (1  ) 1 + 5
8

:
which matches the claimed result. ut
If we combine Lemmas 16 and 19 and solve for  we can see that the regrets
are equal for  = 1321 . Thus, we get the following theorem for biased games where
q = 0.
Theorem 13. The strategy prole (x;y) is a 1321 -equilibrium for biased games
with q = 0.
I.4 A 2/3-approximation for L1-biased games
Finally, we turn our attention to the L1 penalty. We start by giving a com-
binatorial algorithm for nding best responses. Similar to the best response
Algorithm for the L1 penalty, the intuition is to start from the base strategy p
of the row player and shift probability from pure strategies with low payo to
pure strategies with higher payo. This time though, the shifted probability will
be distributed between the pure strategies with higher payo.
Without loss of generality assume that R1y  : : :  Rny, ie., that the
strategies are ordered according to their payo in the unbiased bimatrix game.
The set of pure strategies of the row player can be partitioned into three disjoint
sets according to the payo they yield:
H := fi 2 [n] : Riy = R1yg
M := fi 2 ([n] n H) : R1y  Riy   dr < 0g
L := fi 2 [n] : R1y  Riy   dr > 0g:
Next we giver an algorithm that computes a best response for L1 penalty.
Algorithm 7. Best Response Algorithm for L1 penalty
1. For all i 2 L, set xi = 0.
2. If P  jHj  pmax, then set xi = pi + PjHj for all i 2 H and xj = pj
for j 2M.
3. Else if P < jH [Mj  pmax, then
{ Set xi = pi + pmax for all i 2 H.
{ Set k = bP jHjpmaxpmax c.
{ Set xi = pi + pmax for all i  jHj+ k.
{ Set xjHj+k+1 = pjHj+k+1 + P   (jHj+ k)  pmax.
{ Set xj = pj for all jHj+ k + 2  j  jHj+ jMj.
4. Else set xi = pi +
P
jH[Mj for all i 2 H [M.
Let pmax := maxi2L pi and let P :=
P
i2L pi. Then for every best response
the following lemma holds.
Lemma 20. If L 6= ;, then for any best response x of the row player against
strategy y it holds that kx  pk1  pmax. Else p is the best response.
Proof. Using similar arguments as in Lemma 7, it can be proven that if there
are no pure strategies i and k such that Rky   Riy   dr < 0 then any shifting
of probability decreases the utility of the row player. Thus, the best response
of the player is p. On the other hand, if there are strategies i and k such that
Rky Riy dr > 0, then the utility of the row player increase if all the probability
from strategy i is shifted to pure strategy k. The set L contains all these pure
strategies. Let j 2 L be the pure strategy that denes pmax. Then, all the pmax
probability can be shifted from j to the a pure strategy in H, i.e. a pure strategy
that yields the highest payo, and strictly increase the utility of the player. Thus,
the strategy j is played with zero probability and the claim follows. ut
In what follows assume that L 6= ;, hence pmax > 0. From Lemma 20 follows
that there is a best response where the strategy with the highest payo is played
with probability p1 + pmax. Hence, it can be shifted up to pmax probability
from pure strategies with lower payo to each pure strategy with higher payo,
starting from the second pure strategy etc. After this shift of probabilities there
will be a set of pure strategies that where each one is played with probability
pi + pmax and possibly one pure strategy j that is played with probability less
or equal to pj . The question is whether more probability should be shifted from
the low payo strategies to strategies that yield higher payo. The next lemma
establishes that no pure strategy form L is played with positive probability in
any best response against y.
Lemma 21. In every best response against strategy y all pure strategies i 2 L
are played with zero probability.
Proof. Let K denote denote the set of pure strategies that are played with posi-
tive probability after the rst shifting of probabilities. Without loss of generality
assume that each strategy i 2 K is played with probability pi + pmax. Then
the utility of the player under this strategy is equal to U =
P
i2K(pi + pmax) 
Riy   dr  pmax. For the sake of contradiction, assume that there is one strat-
egy j from L that belongs to K. Suppose that probability  is shifted from the
strategy j to the rst pure strategy. Then the utility for the player is equal to
U + (R1y Rjy  dr) > U , since by denition of L R1y Rjy  dr > 0. Thus,
the utility of the player is increasing if probability is shifted. Notice that the
analysis holds even if the penalty is pmax +  instead of pmax, thus the claim
follows. ut
Thus, all the probability P from strategies from L should be shifted to strate-
gies yield higher payo. The question now is what is the optimal way to distribute
that probability over the strategies with the higher payo. Clearly, the same
amount of probability should be shifted in all strategies in H since it makes the
penalty smaller. Furthermore, it is easy to see that the maximum amount of prob-
ability is shifted to strategies in H. Next we prove that if P  pmax  (jHj+ jMj)
then P is uniformly distributed over the pure strategies in H [M.
Proof. If P  pmax  (jHj+ jMj) then there is a best response where the proba-
bility P is uniformly distributed over the pure strategies in H [M.
Proof. Let jHj+ jMj = k and S = P   k  pmax. Let
U =
X
i2H[M
(pi + pmax +
S
k
)Riy   dr(pmax + S
k
))
be the utility when the probability S is distributed uniformly over all pure strate-
gies inH[M. Furthermore, let U 0 be the utility when  > 0 probability is shifted
from a pure strategy j to the rst pure strategy that yields the highest payo.
Then U 0 = U + (R1y  Rjy   dr), but R1y  Rjy   dr  0 since j 2 H [M.
The claim follows. ut
Using the previous analysis the correctness of the algorithm follows.
Note that, using similar arguments as in Lemma 7 the next lemma can be
proved.
Lemma 22. If dr  1, then p is a dominant strategy.
Furthermore, the combination of Lemma 22 with the fact that best responses
can be computed in polynomial time gives the next theorem.
Theorem 14. In biased games with L1 penalty functions and maxfdr; dcg  1,
an equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time.
Again we can see that there is a connection between the equilibria of the
distance biased game and the well supported Nash equilibria (WSNE) of the
underlying bimatrix game.
Observation 1 Let B =  R;C; br(x;p); bc(y;q); dr; dc be a distance biased
game with L1 penalties and let d := maxfdr; dcg. Any equilirbium of B is a
d-WSNE for the bimatrix game (R;C).
Approximation algorithm For the quality of approximation, we can reuse
the results that we proved for the L1 penalty. Lemma 8 applies unchanged. For
Lemma 9, we observe that dc  bc(y;q)  1 when the penalty bc(y;q) is the
L1 norm, since for this case it holds ky   qk1  1 and it is assumed that
dc  1. Thus, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 15. In biased games with L1 penalties a 2/3-equilibrium can be com-
puted in polynomial time.
J Proof that y
T
y   2ykqk  1  2qk.
Proof. Notice from (7) that for all i we get yi = yk +
1
2 (i k). Using that we
can write the term yTy =
P
i y
2
i as follows for a when y has support size s
sX
i=1
y2i = y
2
i +
X
i6=k
y2i
= y2k +
X
i 6=k

yk +
1
2
(i   k)
2
= sy2k +
X
i 6=k
(i   k)

yk +
1
4
X
i 6=k
(k   i)2:
Then we can see that y
T
y   2yTk qk is increasing as yk increases, since we
know from Lemma 14 that yk > 0. This becomes clear if we take the partial
derivative of y
T
y   2ykqk with respect to yk which is equal to
2syk +
X
i 6=k
(i   k)  2qk = 2syk +
X
i 6=k
2(yi   yk)  2qk
 
since yi = yk +
1
2
(i   k)

= 2syk + 2
X
i6=k
yi   2(s  1)yk   2qk
= 2
sX
i=1
yi   2qk
= 2  2qk
 0 (since yk > 0):
Thus, the value of y
T
y   2ykqk is maximized when yk = 1 and our claim
follows. ut
